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1. NATURE OF THE MATERIALS. In 1963 McMaster University at 
Hamilton in Canada purchased the first part of the Nachlass of 
Bertrand Russell. This voluminous collection of papers contains 
many hundreds of sheets of manuscript on mathematical logic and 
the foundations of mathematics, mainly from the period 1895- 
1912. In addition, among his personal correspondence there are 
quite a lot of relevant letters from all periods. However, 
Russell had little or no secretarial help during his early years 
and threw away many of his manuscript materials, especially 
correspondence. But in 1968 I discovered in Sweden a very 
extensive correspondence between Russell and Philip Jourdain, 
which covered the period 1902-1910 of Russell's most intensive 
logical studies and sheds much new light on the nature of his 
progress. 
Russell's logical system is a complicated mixture of inter- 
acting mathematical and philosophical issues, too vast to 
encompass within one talk. [a] The topics below are chosen partly 
for personal interest and partly for the fact that unpublished 
material provides much new relevant information on them. 
2. THE FALLOW PERIOD: 1903-1905. In his The Principles of 
Mathematics Russell proposed a type theory which he found admit- 
ted a form of his own paradox. He published little in the way 
of a proposed solution for some years, and his manuscripts for 
the immediately following years are very incomplete; but fortunate 
ly he described his efforts in various letters to Jourdain. He 
did not restrict himself to systems with a type structure, but 
attempted to construct a system based on comprehension axioms. 
He saw the problem as finding a criterion by which a propositional 
function determines a class, but he never found a satisfactory or 
workable criterion. An interesting attempt was based on Cantor's 
power-class theorem (which every legitimate class would have to 
obey), on the grounds that a class similar to his paradoxical 
class appeared in the proof of the theorem. It is interesting 
to note that Zermelo's 1908 axiom system, while inadequate in its 
comprehension axiom (as RussellnotedatoncetoJourdain), contained 
also a power-class axiom. 
Among other approaches, Russell also examined Frege's propos- 
al that the extension of a concept cannot fall qua object under 
the extension of another concept if they are to be equivalent. 
He also considered various criteria of membership of an 
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object in a class, and treated propositional functions objects 
separate from their values. But he found all these methods either 
to be formally contradictory or else too complicated or limited 
to be workable. 
3. THE IMPACT OF DENOTING: THE SUBSTITUTIONAL THEORY 1905- 
1906. An important problem which affected several of Russell’s 
methods was the problem of denoting functions. After the 
publication of “On Denoting” in 1905, he began to make progress 
towards the system that eventually appeared in Principia 
Ma thema ti ca . But the nature of the influence of his theory of 
descriptions on his logical system has never been properly under- 
stood, for its full impact occurs only in work which he decided 
not to publish. 
Russell called some of his attempts around 1905 to solve his 
paradox “no-classes” theories, because they involved the 
ontological subsumption of classes under some other logical 
category. One of them was called “the substitutional theory of 
classes and relations”, and its most distinctive feature was 
the elimination not only of classes and relations but also of 
free variables and propositional functions, leaving only proposi- 
tions and constants that could be substituted for constants in 
propositions. The basic component was called a matrix, written 
“p/a”, which was a denoting phrase in Russell's new sense for 
the the description “the result of substituting for a in p by”. 
The resulting logic included quantification, interpreted as over 
a collection of instances of constants rather than in the orthodox 
sense. A matrix is the rough equivalent of a class, so that 
numbers were defined as second-order matrices of the form p’/(p,a>. 
A type theory applied, where types were characterised by the 
number of the argument places. 
The theory does not seem to be inconsistent, but there are a 
lot of technical difficulties and inexactitudes (not to say 
carelessnesses) in it. Russell wrote it up in the summer of 
1906 in a paper for the London Mathematical Society, but he 
withdrew the paper in the autumn and turned back gradually to 
propositional functions and free variables, as they were to 
appear in Principia Mathematics. 
4. THE AXIOM OF CHOICE. The axiom and its ramifications 
was a major problem on its emergence in 1904, and characterised 
a whole new phase in mathematical analysis in examining critically 
the techniques of Weierstrassiananalysis (including Cantorian set 
theory). It was also philosophically significant in suggesting 
various seemingly different grades of non-constructivism. It 
was very prominent in Russell’s correspondence with Jourdain, 
and they held differing views about it. Russell reluctantly 
and provisionally accepted it, but Jourdain vigorously tried to 
disprove its need. 
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Russell first came across it in connection with cardinal 
multiplication, where he saw the need for infinite selections in 
constructing a class for the product of a denumerable infinity of 
cardinals. By 1904 he suspected that it had axiomatic status, 
but rejected as a “failure” Zermelo’s proof of that year of the 
well-ordering theorem for its use of a choice axiom. He then 
proved that his axiom (which he called “the multiplicative axiom") 
was a narrower assumption then Zermelo’s, but later he found that 
the reverse implication was also true, so that the axioms were 
equivalent. 
5. INDIVIDUALS. Principia Mathematics was chiefly written 
between the autumn of 1906 and the autumn of 1909, with some of 
the later sections done mainly by Whitehead during 1910. The 
first volume appeared at the end of 1910, but in January 1911 
Whitehead stopped the printing of the second volume for the 
following reason. 
In Russell’s system, individuals are regarded as empirical 
objects. He tried to minimise this assumption, for he postulated 
the existence of only one individual in order to avoid quantifica- 
tion over an empty universe. But this move limited the defin- 
ability of cardinals to 0 and 1 for the type of individuals; 0, 
1, and 2 for the type of classes of individuals; and so on. 
Now Whitehead had forgotten this point when he prepared the 
section on cardinal arithmetic, and he assumed the axiom of 
infinity. Printing of the second volume was stopped until May 
1911 while he reworked the section. There is no documentary 
means now available positively to identify each piece of re- 
writing, but the most substantial change was the new and elaborate 
“Prefatory Statement of Symbolic Conventions” with which the 
volume commences. 
6. WIENER’S THESIS. In 1913 the 18 year-old Norbert Wiener 
presented at Harvard a Ph.D thesis comparing Principia Mathematics 
with the system of Schrader’s Vorlesungen iiber die Algebra der 
Logik, especially with regard to the logic of relations. In his 
Nachlass in the M.I.T. Archives I found not only another copy of 
his thesis but also a written exchange about it with Russell. 
Wiener established a substantial measure of structural similarity 
between the two systems; but Russell pointed out to him the very 
substantial philosophical difference between his own system 
(following Peano and Frege) and Schrtider’s (following Boole and 
Peirce) . Much of the difference hinged on the distinction, used 
by Russell but ignored by Schriider, between an object and its 
class. This distinction leads to many related distinctions: 
between intensions and extensions, membership and inclusion, and 
the whole philosophy of class including class abstraction, which 
the Schrtiderian style is basically unable to express. 
The single most important piece of‘information to come out 
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of these materials concerns Russell's conversion to Peanoism. 
It is well known that Russell was greatly impressed by Peano's 
contributions to the International Congress of Philosophy at 
Paris in 1900, but he never specified in his writings the exact 
source of his initial inspiration. However, he told Wiener that 
he was originally alerted to Peano's superiority by a discussion 
at Paris between Peano and Schr5der, in which Peano emphasized 
the need for a notation for "the". Peano himself eschewed 
philosophising about mathematical logic, but Russell was considering 
questions such as the abstraction of "the" class satisfying a 
condition, the class-as-many as opposed to "the" class-as-one, 
and objects and their unit classes -- the building bricks of the 
logic with which he was to lead to supplant in many ways the 
Boolean approach that Schrbder followed. 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE 
Part of section 3 was given at the end of the session on 
foundations. Further details for this article will be found in 
these writings: The Russell Archives: Some new light on Russell's 
logicism, Ann. Sci., 31 (1974), pp. 387-406; Wiener on the logics 
of Russell & Schr6der, Ann. Sci., 32 (1975), pp. 103-132; and 
Dear Russell-Dear Jourdain (an edition of their correspondence, 
to be published in 1976 by Duckworth's of London). 
NOTES 
a. I follow the convention among commentators on Principia 
Mathematics of automatically but silently including Whitehead 
when referring only to Russell, even though some injustice may 
thereby accrue to Whitehead. In fact, the convention is but 
little used in this paper, since the aspects discussed were 
definitely Russell's own principal concern. 
DISCUSSION 
Dieudonn6 warned historians of mathematics that the influence 
of Russell on mathematicians has always been negligible, and 
that his no-type (substitutional) theory indicated how poor a 
mathematician he was -- whatever influence he had was on logicians, 
not mathematicians. 
Dreben pointed out that Russell in Principia Mathematics 
[Although Whitehead was the senior author, his role was consistently 
belittled by discussants at the Conference. -- Ed.] and Frege in 
earlier work were trying to do foundational research in the 
larger sense of proposing a philosophy of mathematics. In contrast, 
Zermelo and von Neumann were primarily concerned with technical 
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questions, rather than foundational ones. Russell was unconcerned 
with influencing working mathematicians but did, in fact, influ- 
ence them more than DieudonnQ realized. The formal aspect of 
Bourbaki was only possible because the linguistic innovations 
of Frege and Peano, as extended in Principia Mathematics, allowed 
large parts of mathematics to be formalized. In contrast to 
axiomatization, Dreben concluded, the study of foundations asks 
what it means when one does mathematics. 
Putnam then suggested that "foundations of mathematics" has 
become an obsolete expression. To Russell and Hilbert, found- 
ations meant solving philosophical problems by mathematical 
means. [This may have been truer of Felix Klein and PoincarC, 
who were concerned about the interplay of intuition and reason, 
than of Hilbert--Ed.] Today, Putnam continued, no one believes 
such problems can be solved by mathematical means. 
Birkhoff replied that Russell insisted that mathematics is 
a branch of logic, clearly a big lie. Putnam countered that 
Russell said rather that after his work no one would be able to 
draw a sharp line between logic and mathematics -- and that was 
true. This ended the discussion. 
